The aftermath of Geneva
March 23, 2013, 6:04 pmReflecting on the post-Geneva scenario, the conclusion is irresistible that the very fact that the resolution was moved at all de-stabilized India, endangering the continuity of its Congress-led central government. Tamil Nadu was able to demonstrate that in the context of coalition politics, the tail could wag the dog and India was again forced into a situation of having to vote at UNHRC for a country specific resolution much against the wish of the New Delhi government and India’s national self-interest. This was the case in Geneva last year too. We, fortunately, did not fall into the trap of negotiating with the US to dilute the early drafts of the resolution and agree to its adoption by consensus. Although it was manifestly clear that the resolution, either the hard-line original or a softer version would be carried, the vote that did take place was necessary from Sri Lanka’s point of view. The final division saw those in favour numbering one more than last year. But that is of negligible significance given that the composition of UNHRC had changed since the previous vote.
A Lanka bashing resolution will now be moved in the Indian Parliament to further placate Tamil Nadu. But Karunanidhi’s and Jayalalitha’s wish that India moved to harden the Geneva draft did not come to pass; in fact it was quite the contrary. We must remember that resolutions in the UN system, either in Geneva or even at the General Assembly in New York, are not legally binding. What will be binding will be a Security Council resolution, but given the veto powers the permanent members of that body enjoy, such a resolution against Sri Lanka has about as much chance as a snowball in the sun. Can sanctions be applied against us? If such be the case, they must be bilaterally and not collectively imposed and seem unlikely at this point of time. Nevertheless we must take note of the fact that the post-war situation here is more and more an issue that is not totally ours any more but increasingly an internal matter in India too. While it is true that parochial political interests in Tamil Nadu, for purposes of their own, are whipping up anti-Sri Lanka sentiments in the State, we are not totally unaffected by the backlash. It is no longer possible for Buddhist pilgrims from here to engage via Chennai or other South Indian cities in the Dambadiva vandana that is the ultimate dream of many ageing upasakas and upasaka ammas. However the more costly alternative of reaching the important North Indian sites by air remains open.
There have been reports of even Lankan Buddhist monks being assaulted in Tamil Nadu. No doubt the Indian center will do its best to ensure that such incidents are minimized or wholly eliminated. But its hands are tied to the extent that law enforcement in the states is the business of the state governments. For the moment Sri Lankan flights to South India have been halved. We will not be overly optimistic in expecting tempers to cool sooner than later and normal interactions between people of the two countries quickly resuming. We will have to live with the reality that politicians in Tamil Nadu will continue to extract the maximum leverage from the Indian center on issues concerning Sri Lanka. It is to be expected that the Indian Navy and Coastguard will be less interested in preventing Indian fishermen crossing the International Maritime Boundary between the two countries and poaching in Sri Lanka’s territorial waters. These fishermen had virtual carte blanche during the fighting of fishing in our waters with Lankan fishermen restricted from going out to sea. While that has changed post-war, the Indians are not willing to forego the rich catches they took in our waters and are already presenting such incursions as ``traditional fishing rights.’’ Right now it will be unrealistic to expect even Indian central agencies to assist any preventive effort however marginal.
The internationalization of the post-war situation here, with the subject now very much in the UNHRC agenda, can lead to a process of taking it beyond where it presently stands. What was a wholly domestic issue has been made into an Indo-Sri Lankan issue, a Sri Lanka – South Indian issue and even an internal Indian issue. There are analysts who believe that in the worst case scenario, it could even be considered a matter of regional stability. That could lead to a push for the matter to be addressed at the UN Security Council although, as explained above, there is no possibility of any negative resolution being adopted. While the Tamil diaspora, that we like to think of as the LTTE rump, may be less forthcoming with funds now that the fighting is over, and the element of once evident extortion no longer exists, those organizations intent on sustaining the international lobbies and NGO activists are not without resources. Such pressure will continue as long as events such as those in Geneva last week remain on the agenda of the UN system. Our focus must necessarily be more on reconciliation that on accountability and there is every possibility of demonstrating progress achieved on this front.
As for accountability, it must of course apply to both sides. Who in the LTTE is to be held accountable today? The 30-year war was not fought according to the Queensberry rules as we have previously said in these columns and it would be foolish of anybody to claim that no war crimes were committed during the long drawn and brutal conflict. That is well known. No purpose will be served by any kind witch-hunt at this stage when what is more necessary is to best serve the victims of the conflict and bring about a closure of a sorry chapter of this nation’s contemporary history.
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