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The Government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa could not have asked for more. The Opposition UNP’s offer to work with the government on the issues and problems flowing from the second US resolution at the UNHRC, Geneva, means different things to different stake-holders nearer home and afar. Yet, on the face of it, UNP Leader and former Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe, may have sent out the signal to his fellow-Sri Lankans that the nation is united on the issue at hand. Or, so would he like it to be seen.The UNP had maintained silence on the issue for long. It had obviously hoped for – or, anticipated – a climb-down either by Washington or Colombo. Until the vote is taken, or until the final draft is submitted for vote, there could still be hopes in many and anxieties in some about a ‘compromise resolution’ contributed by – and to – a climb-down by both. The way, Sri Lanka feels cornered, that could well be saying a lot, depending of course on the wording of a ‘compromise resolution’, if any.
The UNP does not want to see Sri Lanka being relegated as a ‘pariah State,’ Wickremesinghe has said. A senior party colleague of his has compared Sri Lanka to Sudan. It was the kind of comparison that had filtered down almost down to the last person in the public discourse across the country in the run-up to ‘Eelam War IV.’ It had remained in the national idiom until the course of the war took a turn in the government’s favour.
MoU With A Caveat
The UNP’s offer however comes with a caveat – or, many hidden in one. It is ready to sign a MoU with the government ‘to support the country in dealing with the aftermath of the impending resolution at the UNCHRC,’ media reports have quoted Wickremesinghe as saying. To him, and hence the UNP, passage for the resolution is a certainty. It is a reflection of the true state of affairs at Geneva.
At the UNHRC, the confusion, if any, is only about the ‘compromise’ part of the resolution. Sri Lanka anyway is not a voting member this year as last, and hence it will not be called upon to demonstrate its climb down, nor would it have to call for a vote, if it feels that its concerns about the US draft have been addressed.
A MoU implies negotiations and political compromises nearer home. The UNP, Wickremesinghe has said, would support the government in implementing the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) and the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, and give the required assistance in solving the national issue, he added. Translated, it also means that the UNP’s promised backing for any parliamentary support to resolve the ‘ethnic issue’ still remains.
Bipartisan, But…
To the international community (read: West), seeking to corner Sri Lanka at the UNHRC, the UNP offer implies ‘bipartisan commitment’ from the two ‘Sinhala majors,’ the other being the SLFP Leader of the ruling UPFA. Considering that the UNHRC resolution now and earlier, would expect continuing action from the Colombo Government on flagged issues and constantly updated report-cards, it would also mean that any future government in Colombo, if and when headed by the UNP, could be expected to stand by the present-day commitments of the Sri Lankan State.
The UNP position now would still imply a ‘consensus resolution’ at the UNHRC. Or, the UNP too could help the government market it nearer home. The party would not want to be dubbed and targeted as a ‘traitor’ to the ‘national cause,’ after all.
A contested resolution on which there is a vote implies that the Sri Lankan Government, and the SLFP leader of the ruling party combined, could not be expected to enforce the resolution sincerely and/or seriously – which alone could meet the perceived global demands and expectations, if at all.
Sessions and resolutions later, it would either be a deadlock still, or an otherwise divided Sinhala polity standing united to defend its security forces – and by extension, the political leadership – against most, if not all charges of ‘war crimes’ and ‘accountability.’ The UNP could not be painted into a corner within the country and expect to live on the pleasure/pressure of the international community, as it is often seen as doing.
Great Sinhala Conspiracy?
There will however be others in Sri Lanka who may see in the UNP’s current offer, yet another in a series of ‘great Sinhala conspiracies’ aimed at side-stepping the ‘ethnic issue’ and side-lining the Tamils, dating back to Independence in 1948. The mistrust in the Tamils is there, and it is for real – whatever the justification or otherwise.
Coming as it does after the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) has openly aligned with the UNP in a ‘grand alliance’ of sorts for elections that have been promised in the Northern Province by September – and otherwise, too – the larger Tamil community would be debating on the UNP offer to the government in both ways. However, the UNP’s offer to the government need not compromise its commitment to the TNA.
Instead, the UNP can help strengthen the cause, the party having attempted to broker a solution to the ethnic issue between the government and the TNA, and publicly so in Parliament, not very long ago. The government faltered at the last-minute, as on many other occasions, and the UNP efforts fell through. There was/is a lesson in it for all stake-holders in Sri Lanka.
Yet, the mistrust between the Tamils and the Sinhalese, the Tamil polity and the Sri Lankan State, is mutual – even after the LTTE’s exit. If anything, there is a greater concern now that the ‘ethnic issue’ has been internationalised more than at any time in the past. Nearer home in Sri Lanka, the UNP cannot expect its silence to gather public support to its own political cause than a qualified support to the government as one doing it for the party. The party has its experience from ‘Eelam War IV,’ when it mocked at the ‘nationalist sentiments’ forming part of the government propaganda of the day. It does not seem wanting to repeat the mistake, and yet does not want to be seen as playing second fiddle to the Rajapaksa leadership.
Credibility Factor
Neither is good politics, and the UNP seems intent on taking a complicated way forward, sounding simplistic, however. If nothing else, the UNP cannot also be seen as submerging its political identity with that of the government when it is not a part of that government, and not certainly leading the same. It would not want to play the SLFP’s game for it.
By offering to sign a MoU with the government at the same time, the UNP has underlined the credibility factor still haunting the Sri Lankan State in the eyes of the international community, starting with the Indian neighbour. Across the Palk Strait, it’s not about the ‘Tamil Nadu factor’ still. It is about the unkept promises on a negotiated settlement, post-war.
In his statement thus, Wickremesinghe said that the UNP would support the government in implementing the LLRC, and the Thirteenth Amendment and give the required assistance in solving the national issue. Between them, the LLRC and 13-A address the broad contours covered by the UNHRC resolutions – the current draft and the previous one, passed in March last year.
On the domestic front, too, the LLRC Report and the government-commissioned Action Plan have made similar commitments. The 13-A, as a part of the nation’s Constitution, celebrated its unsung silver jubilee a few months ago. Implementation has faltered, almost to the point of no return. The UNP is reiterating, from the Opposition Benches, what the Sri Lankan Government and the Rajapaksa leadership are committed to.The two ‘Sinhala majors’ have been expansive in favouring 13-A while in the Opposition, but restrictive in its application while in power. It flows from twin anxieties. One such anxiety is about the ‘Sinhala majority vote-bank,’ or at least the ‘Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist’ constituency.
Whether the constituency is numerically strong or not, it has remained vocally strong enough that none in power wants to cross their path. No government thus has negotiated with them. Instead, they have only tried to hijack their perceived cause, seeking to render them electorally as irrelevant as possible. It cut both ways.
The other anxiety of the SLFP and the UNP about 13-A, acquired while in power, is about the justifiable apprehension of the Sri Lankan State, which they then represent, about the Tamils – moderates and/ or militants – going back on their commitments. The Indian and Norwegian experiences from the past, as also the present posturing of the rest of the international community, will not convince them about the latter’s sincerity in the matter, any more.
It is possible that the UNP, like friends of Sri Lanka hope, that ‘accountability,’ based on the LLRC Report and power-devolution flowing from 13-A, both with full implementation, would do the trick at the UNHRC. This could also be a hidden proposition to the international community, not to expect anything more from a future UNP Government, either. This should set the US and the rest thinking, even more.
(The writer is Director, Chennai Chapter of the Observer Research Foundation, the multi-disciplinary Indian public-policy think-tank, headquartered in New Delhi. email: sathiyam54@gmail.com